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NOTES
NOTE: IWERSON v. DUSHEK
Frank and Ida Beals, husband and wife, executed a joint and
mutual will in which, after certain bequests to charity, each left the
residue of his or her estate to the survivor for life with one half the
remainder to go to Ida's brother and sister and the other half to
Frank's daughter, pursuant to a common scheme of disposition. In
addition, the life tenant was given power to dispose of the property
for his or her "care, maintenance, comfort, convenience, recreation
and pleasure."'
Ida died first and Frank, after probating the will and taking
Ida's property, attempted to exclude Ida's relatives from the re-
mainder, first, by executing a will leaving it to his daughter, and,
second, by placing the property in a trust which, as amended,
named his daughter as sole beneficiary.
After Frank's death, Ida's relatives, Dushek and Mabbot,
sought to realize their remainder interests by suit against appellant
Bettina Iwerson, Frank's daughter, both individually and as execu-
trix of Frank's estate, to compel specific performance of an alleged
contract to make joint and mutual wills and to subject Ida's prop-
erty in her hands to a constructive trust. The Arkansas Supreme
Court, affirming the chancellor's decision below, upheld the exist-
ence of the claimed contract and struck down Frank's attempts to
defeat it. Iwerson v. Dushek, 260 Ark. 771, 543 S.W.2d 942 (1976).
While a large part of the litigation dealt with the extent of the power
of disposition, the principal case is of primary interest for having
given supreme court approval to a joint and mutual will and for
having indicated how the reciprocal provisions would be enforced.
The definitions of joint, mutual, and joint and mutual wills
appear simple and straightforward. A joint will results when two or
more persons execute separate wills in one document.' Mutual wills
are separate wills of two or more persons having reciprocal provi-
sions.3 A joint and mutual will is a joint will with reciprocal provi-
sions.4 While it is possible to have a joint will that is not reciprocal
1. lwerson v. Dushek, 260 Ark. 771, 776, 543 S.W.2d 942, 945-46 (1976).
2. Frazier v. Patterson, 243 Ill. 80, 90 N.E. 216 (1909).
3. Id. at __, 90 N.E. 216.
4. Id.
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in nature, most joint wills are joint and mutual.
The history of joint wills indicates that they had a turbulent
beginning. Early cases in England and the United States ruled that
joint wills were invalid,5 but the general rule today is to the con-
trary.' They are sometimes ruled invalid today when the devise of
a predeceasing testator is not to take effect until the death of the
surviving testator.7 This results from the rule that a will takes effect,
if at all, at the death of the testator.'
When the terms of a joint and mutual will are reciprocal only,
leaving the estate in fee simple to the survivor with no provisions
for third party remaindermen, the survivor is free to make a new will
or to die intestate.9 The joint and mutual will is valid in this situa-
tion only with respect to the first decedent; the will is not effective
with respect to the survivor because all terms of the will are fulfilled
by the predecease of the co-testator.10 This could be characterized
as a "winner-take-all" situation.
Although reciprocal wills without remainder provisions create
relatively few problems, the situation is different when the joint or
mutual wills specify a common scheme of distribution to third par-
ties as remaindermen following the life estate of the surviving testa-
tor. Complications arise in the determination of the intentions of the
joint testators, however, when there is a devise of a remainder pur-
suant to a common scheme of disposition. The courts must deter-
mine whether the common scheme of third party remaindermen is
the result of a contract to make reciprocal wills. If the joint will is
made pursuant to a contract, either implied, oral or written, the
surviving testator is estopped from defeating the provisions of that
will after the death of the predeceasing testator." If there is no
contract, however, the survivor may revoke the joint will. 2
5. T. Atkinson, Law of Wills, 223 (2d ed. 1953).
6. American Trust & Safe Deposit Co. v. Eckhardt, 331 Ill. 261, 162 N.E. 843 (1928);
Anderson v. Anderson, 181 Iowa 578, 164 N.W. 1042 (1917).
7. Epperson v. White, 156 Tenn. 155, 299 S.W. 812 (1927); Hershey v. Clark, 35 Ark.
17 (1879).
8. Epperson v. White, 156 Tenn. 155, 299 S.W. 812 (1927); Hershey v. Clark, 35 Ark.
17 (1879).
9. See Culver v. Hess, 234 Iowa 877, 14 N.W.2d 692 (1944); In re Pennington's Estate,
158 Kan. 495, 148 P.2d 516 (1944).
10. Culver v. Hess, 234 Iowa 877, 14 N.W.2d 692 (1944).
11. Nye v. Bradford, 144 Tex. 618, 193 S.W.2d 165 (1946); Culver v. Hess, 234 Iowa 877,
14 N.W.2d 692 (1944); Smith v. Thompson, 250 Mich. 302, 230 N.W. 156 (1930); Frazier v.
Patterson, 243 Ill. 80, 90 N.E. 216 (1909).
12. In the instance of joint wills with reciprocal terms, many courts address the problem
of whether a contract exists by finding an implied contract from the terms of the will and
surrounding circumstances, rather than by proof of an oral contract. Janes v. Rogers, 224 Ark.
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Written contracts to make reciprocal wills may be contained in
the will or wills of the testators, or may be represented by separate
documents. The terms of these contracts are enforceable as are other
written contracts for consideration. The problems concerning con-
tracts to make reciprocal wills arise when there is no written agree-
ment contained either within the will or wills or in separate docu-
ments. In such cases an oral contract must be proved or a contract
must arise by implication from the wills and surrounding circum-
stances.'3
The Statute of Frauds 4 appears to be a bar against the enforce-
ability of oral or implied contracts to make reciprocal wills because
such contracts are required to be in writing. 5 However, using the
equitable theory of part performance, the courts have upheld such
contracts on the basis of equitable estoppel. 6 Although some courts
have considered such wills revocable during the concurrent lifetimes
of the co-testators, when notice is given, 7 the general rule is that the
survivor who takes the benefits of a joint or mutual will made pur-
suant to a contract is equitably estopped from breaching such a
contract even though the contract was not in writing.' The courts'
language is occasionally to the effect that once the first testator dies,
other parties to the contract are estopped from breaching it, and the
deceased party is considered to have fully performed thus leaving
it unclear whether acceptance of benefits is invariably required.
In a situation where an oral or implied contract is alleged, there
is still a major problem of proving its existence. It is generally held
that the making of joint or mutual wills with reciprocal terms does
not suffice to prove the existence of a contract.20 Extrinsic evidence
116, 271 S.W.2d 930 (1954); Nye v. Bradford, 144 Tex. 618, 193 S.W.2d 165 (1946); Culver v.
Hess, 234 Iowa 877, 14 N.W.2d 692 (1944); Williams v. Williams, 123 Va. 643, 96 S.E. 749
(1918); Frazier v. Patterson, 243 Ill. 80, 90 N.E. 216 (1909).
13. In Smith v. Thompson, 250 Mich. 302, 230 N.W. 156 (1930), an oral contract was
found to exist for the making of mutual wills.
14. Courts in this particular type of case generally do not specify which Statute of
Frauds is being violated.
15. O'Connor v. Immele, 77 N.D. 346, 43 N.W.2d 649 (1950).
16. Id.
17. Anderson v. Anderson, 181 Iowa 578, 164 N.W. 1042 (1917); McClanahan v.
McClanahan, 77 Wash. 138, 137 P. 479 (1913); Frazier v. Patterson, 243 Ill. 80, 90 N.E. 216
(1909).
18. Nye v. Bradford, 144 Tex. 618, 193 S.W.2d 165 (1946); Smith v. Thompson, 250
Mich. 302, 230 N.W. 156 (1930); Anderson v. Anderson, 181 Iowa 578, 164 N.W. 1042 (1917);
Frazier v. Patterson, 243 Ill. 80, 90 N.E. 216 (1909).
19. E.g., O'Connor v. Immele, 77 N.D. 346, 43 N.W.2d 649 (1950) (survivor had ac-
cepted benefits under deceased's will.).
20. Monninger v. Koob, 405 Ill. 417, 91 N.E.2d 411 (1950); Knox v. Perkins, 86 N.H.
19781
80 UALR LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 1
is usually required in proving such an agreement,2 although the
burden of proof appears less difficult to satisfy in the case of joint
wills, than when mutual wills are involved.2 This is true because
most courts treat the contracts as arising by implication in the
instance of joint wills.2 1 A court will look at the terms of the will and
its form and surrounding circumstances to determine if a contract
should be inferred.24 Some courts have gone as far as stating that
the contract may be inferred from the joint will document itself.2
Another problem arises in the enforcement of such contracts,
written, oral or implied, because the theory of wills differs from that
of contracts in that wills are ambulatory while contracts are mu-
tually binding.26 Nevertheless, an injured party such as a benefici-
ary excluded in a subsequent will finds his remedy not in a contest
of the subsequent will in probate, but in an action in equity for
specific performance of the contract, or at law for breach of con-
tract.Y In the situation where the contract is oral or implied, the
injured party's remedy is usually in equity because of the assertion
of equitable doctrines of part performance and equitable estoppel in
a suit for specific performance. 2
Arkansas law pertaining to reciprocal wills appears to follow the
generally prevailing views. A joint will was first held valid in George
v. Smith.21 However, joint wills which do not take effect until the
death of the survivor have been held invalid3
66, 163 A. 497 (1932); Canada v. Ihmsen, 33 Wyo. 439, 240 P. 927 (1925); Wanger v. Mart,
257 Mo. 482, 165 S.W. 1027 (1914).
21. Nye v. Bradford, 144 Tex. 618, 193 S.W.2d 165 (1946); Canada v. Ihmsen, 33 Wyo.
439, 240 P. 927 (1925); Anderson v. Anderson, 181 Iowa 578, 164 N.W. 1042 (1917).
22. In Wanger v. Marr, 257 Mo. 482, 165 S.W. 1027 (1914), the court discusses the
reasoning as to why the burden of proof is less in the situation concerning a joint will. Cf.
Rolls v. Allen, 204 Cal. 604, 269 P. 450 (1928) (California statute declaring all wills revocable
construed to require clear and convincing evidence of any contract binding parties to joint
and mutual will agreements.).
23. See note 12 supra.
24. See note 12 supra.
25. Frazier v. Patterson, 243 Il. 80, 90 N.E. 216 (1909).
26. Doyle v. Fischer, 183 Wis. 599, 198 N.W. 763 (1924); Williams v. Williams, 123 Va.
643, 96 S.E. 749 (1918).
27. Frazier v. Patterson, 243 Ill. 80, 90 N.E. 216 (1909).
28. Where the plaintiff invokes the doctrine of part performance to avoid the bar of the
Statute of Frauds, he is normally required to sue in equity for specific performance. Estoppel,
however, may be invoked at law as well as in equity. Some courts permit either doctrine to
be applied at law. See D. Dobbs, Remedies 961-64 (1973). Other considerations, however, may
make specific performance the more appropriate remedy for enforcement of contracts pertain-
ing to testamentary dispositions. Supra note 18, for cases applying equitable estoppel.
29. 216 Ark. 896, 227 S.W.2d 952 (1950).
30. Hershey v. Clark, 35 Ark. 17 (1879).
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Janes v. Rogers' addressed the particular problems concerning
implied contracts to make reciprocal wills. The court discussed the
ambulatory nature of wills and determined that the remedy was a
suit in equity based on specific performance of the provisions of the
mutual wills.3" The court held that oral contracts would be enforce-
able in equity.3 In the situation where reciprocal wills were made
pursuant to an oral contract, the death or acceptance of benefits of
the first testator would equitably estop the survivor from breaching
the contract by revoking the reciprocal will. The court determined
that the burden of proof in such cases would be "clear and convinc-
ing evidence. ' 34 This would appear to be a major obstacle in proving
the existence of a contract, but the court applied the general rule
that such contracts may arise by implication from the will itself and
the circumstances surrounding the will's execution.35 The court,
using extrinsic evidence, found that an implied contract existed in
this particular situation.
To ascertain the reasoning in Iwerson v. Dushek,36 attention
must be directed to its sister case, Iwerson v. Mabbott,31 which
involved a construction of the joint will. The court, with knowledge
of the pending appeal of Iwerson II, limited its determination to the
issue of whether the devisee, Frank Beals, given a life estate with
powers of disposition during his life, could dispose of such property
by his subsequent will. The probate court held that such a disposi-
tion was beyond the powers granted to Frank Beals by the life es-
tate.
The appellant, Bettina Iwerson, contended that the power
granted with the life estate, although not amounting to a fee simple
in the property, was an unlimited power of disposition tantamount
to a general power of appointment which included a power to ap-
point by will. The court was extremely careful to abstain from de-
ciding what powers were granted to decedent Frank Beals during his
life. Justice Fogleman hypothesized that, even if Frank Beals had
full power to dispose of the property during his life, the general rule
is that a person granted a life estate with general powers of disposi-
31. 224 Ark. 116, 271 S.W.2d 930 (1954).
32. Id.
33. Id. at 119, 271 S.W.2d at 932.
34. Id. See also Crews v. Crews, 212 Ark. 734, 207 S.W.2d 606 (1948).
35. Janes v. Rogers, 224 Ark. 116, 271 S.W.2d 930 (1954).
36. 260 Ark. 771, 543 S.W.2d 942 (1976), hereinafter referred to as Iwerson II.
37. Iwerson v. Mabbott, No. 75-241 (Ark., July 19, 1976), hereinafter referred to as
Iwerson I.
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tion for life cannot exercise those powers by will. 8 The powers
granted by such a life estate are inter vivos, not testamentary.
The appellant further contended that since the will was exe-
cuted during Beals' life, he had exercised his general power of dispo-
sition during his lifetime. The court held that the execution of a will
during an individual's lifetime is not equivalent to an inter vivos
exercise of the power. A will is not effective until the death of the
testator and thus the exercise of the power is not effective until the
testator's death.3 9
Bearing in mind the determinations made in Iwerson I and
considering the extreme caution used by the court not to determine
the extent of Frank Beals' inter vivos powers, it is possible to under-
stand the court's reasoning in Iwerson II. This case was an appeal
from the chancery court decision pertaining to specific performance
of a contract to make reciprocal wills between Frank and Ida Beals
by Frank Beals' conveyance of Ida Beals' property to a trust.
The court began its discussion by addressing the issue of
whether there was a contract to make reciprocal wills. There was no
express agreement included in the instrument, and no separate writ-
ten contract was admitted as evidence. If there was such a contract,
it had to be an oral agreement subject to inference from the will and
surrounding circumstances."
The court looked at the surrounding circumstances and as-
sumed that the will was drafted primarily to protect Frank Beals'
daughter. Frank Beals was thirty years older than Ida Beals and
undoubtedly expected to predecease her. Frank had also transferred
the bulk of his property to Ida to avoid paying alimony to a previous
spouse. Apparently, the purpose of the will was to insure that his
daughter would retain a one-half interest in the total estate in case
he predeceased Ida Beals. These facts coupled with the simultane-
ous execution of the joint will were found by the court to be suffi-
cient to permit an inference that Frank and Ida Beals had agreed
to a common scheme of distribution. In fact, the form of the will was
viewed as being very much like a contract.
With regard to the extent of the powers of disposition granted
38. See United States v. Moore, 197 Ark. 664, 124 S.W.2d 807 (1939); Archer v. Palmer,
112 Ark. 527, 167 S.W. 99 (1914).
39. The court in Iwerson I refers to State v. Gaughan, 124 Ark. 548, 187 S.W. 918 (1916),
but only states that the opinion appears to stand for the proposition that a general power of
disposition during one's life does not authorize the disposition of such property by will. This
derived from the fact that the transfer of property does not take effect until the death of the
testator.
40. Janes v. Rogers, 224 Ark. 116, 271 S.W.2d 930 (1954).
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under the life estate, the appellant contended that the terms
"recreation and pleasure" in the life estate should allow the transfer
of the estate to her by trust. Citing Galloway v. Sewell," the court
stated the general rule that "the use of a thing does not mean the
thing itself, but means that the user is to enjoy, hold, occupy, or
have in some manner the benefit thereof .... ",42 The use of the life
estate did not include the corpus but only the income derived from
the corpus. Beals had a limited power of disposition and could not
use the property for purposes other than those provided for in the
will.43 This did not include the trust arrangement Beals attempted
to create.
The court thus determined that a valid contract, arising by
implication from the instrument itself as well as extrinsic circum-
stances, was in effect with regard to the joint and mutual will. This
contract could not be rescinded after the death of Ida Beals because
she had fully performed and equity would require specific perform-
ance of the terms of the joint will. The court concluded by ruling
the trust invalid because it violated the contract found in the joint
will in addition to having exceeded the powers of disposition granted
to the survivor in the life estate from the decedent.
That there was some form of agreement between the Beals pur-
suant to the making of the will is fairly apparent. However, the
court's comparison of the will to a contract presents an interesting
prospect. The court in effect found sufficient indication of a contract
from the will itself. Granted, the court took into account the sur-
rounding circumstances and found the probable intentions of the
will were to insure a one-half interest in the remainder estate to
Bettina Iwerson, but there was very little extrinsic evidence of an
express oral contract between Frank and Ida Beals.
It is not unusual for a court to find an implied contract from
the will," but the court's comparison of the will to an express writ-
ten contract significantly reduces the burden of proof required for
finding such a contract. In that regard it is noteworthy that the
court included the document as an appendix to the opinion. This
might be interpreted to mean the court intended to endorse this
particular form as a valid and acceptable example of draftmanship
of joint wills made pursuant to a contract. However, before whole-
41. 162 Ark. 627, 258 S.W. 655 (1924).
42. Id. at 632, 258 S.W. at 656.
43. Owen v. Dumas, 200 Ark. 601, 140 S.W.2d 101 (1940); See also, Badgett v. Badgett,
115 Ark. 9, 170 S.W. 484 (1914); Chase v. Cartwright, 53 Ark. 358, 14 S.W. 90 (1890).
44. See note 12 supra.
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sale utilization of this form of joint reciprocal will is implemented,
it should be recognized that some problems could arise from this
use.
The first warning in regard to the specific form of joint will used
in this case is that it does not contain a written contract with defi-
nite terms stating the provisions of the agreement. Although the
remainder was eventually divided between the named third parties
according to the provisions of the joint will, the costs in enforcing
the individuals' specific rights most assuredly reduced that amount
substantially. When individuals must carry two appeals to the su-
preme court before a final determination can be reached, it is not
beneficial to use such an instrument. A written contract specifically
stating the intentions of the parties would seem preferable because
it would clarify the issues as to what was intended by the contract-
ing parties. However, considering the extremes to which the court
went in affirming this style of joint reciprocal wills, litigation in the
future regarding contracts when this specific form is used should be
greatly reduced.
In reference to the court's determination that Frank Beals'
power of disposition granted under the life estate was limited, it is
interesting to note that the court, after being extremely careful not
to decide that issue in Iwerson I, did not elaborate on it in Iwerson
I.This again reflects the importance the court placed upon the
finding of a contract to make reciprocal wills. Although the court
could have easily disposed of this case initially on the basis of lim-
ited powers of disposition at least if only Ida's property was in-
volved, they purposely deferred judgment until the issue of recipro-
cal wills made pursuant to a contract was before them. This conclu-
sion is substantiated by the court's knowledge at the time of Iwerson
I that Iwerson I would be forthcoming.
In particular instances like the present case where spouses have
children from previous marriages or specific persons in mind whom
they wish to share in the remainder estate, the joint will appears to
be an adequate solution to their problem. The binding aspects of the
contract insure that the remainder estate will be devised according
to a common scheme agreed upon by the co-testators. Unfortun-
ately, this common intent may be frustrated in other ways. Can the
survivor frustrate the remainder clause of the joint will by the use
of inter vivos transfers? Granted, a similar attempt by Frank Beals
was disallowed by Iwerson I, but these transfers were barred by the
specific provisions of the life estate and not by the contract. In fact,
Frank Beals did transfer some of what apparently was his separate
property to Mrs. Iwerson during his lifetime, but these transfers
[Vol. 1,
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were not contested in this litigation.
To place the above question in a better perspective, suppose
that Ida Beals had survived Frank Beals. Bearing in mind that the
bulk of the property was in her name and not limited by a life estate,
assume that she transfers the bulk of the estate to third parties
using inter vivos transfers. This, in effect, frustrates the purpose of
the joint reciprocal will and leaves Mrs. Iwerson out in the cold.
Would Mrs. Iwerson have a cause of action to bar or set aside such
transfers because they were for the purpose of defeating her remain-
der share? It must be remembered that the remainder clause of the
joint will does not specify particular property but speaks in terms
of shares in the bulk estate. This question is not answered in the
present case, nor is it addressed in the cases reviewed by this writer.
Nevertheless, it is an important question which must be resolved
before the joint will becomes a common method of planning clients'
estates.
Keith N. Johnson
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